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ON WHAT IT TAKES TO BE AN EXPERT 
 
 
 
Abstract. This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. 
Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the 
conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion 
of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to 
provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according 
to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress 
of their discipline. In this paper, I defend the thesis that cognitive experts should be 
identified by their ability to perform the latter function rather than the former, as 
novice-oriented accounts, unlike research-oriented ones, fail to comply with the rules 
of a functionalist approach to expertise. 
 
 
(word count: 9729) 
 
 
§1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent works in social epistemology have shown how challenging it is to define what it 
takes for one to be a cognitive expert in some field.1 Yet it seems important to be able to 
distinguish those trustworthy subjects who contribute to the epistemic welfare of our 
communities from those who do not deserve our epistemic credit and resources. 
Alvin Goldman has been trying to settle the issue for more than two decades (see 
1991, 2001, 2018), but his view of expertise has received persistent criticism. Some of 
Goldman’s critics (e.g., Coady 2006, Scholz 2009) accept his general strategy of reaching 
a satisfactory definition of an expert through conceptual analysis, but question some—or, 
every—condition of his account. Others reject the methodology of Goldman’s project and 
suggest alternative strategies for analysing the notion of an expert, such as a 
Wittgensteinian family-resemblance route (Majdik and Keith 2011), Edward Craig’s 
                                                        
1 This paper explores the topic of cognitive or intellectual expertise, i.e., the expertise pertaining to an 
agent’s propositional knowledge and understanding. A discussion of practical or performative expertise, 
i.e., the expertise pertaining to an agent’s “competence at performing a task” (Watson 2018: 40), would 
raise questions about the specific skills or know-how that some kinds of experts are required to possess, as 
it happens with pianists, football players, magicians and so forth. For the purposes of this paper, I leave 
practical expertise and questions about know-how aside.   
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practical explication approach (Quast 2018), and Nelson Goodman’s symptom approach 
(Scholz 2018).  
In this paper, taking up insights from these approaches and from Goldman’s most 
recent attempt to “advance a definition of expertise that … is in roughly the same territory 
of some of his critics” (2018: 3), I will demonstrate that a conceptual analysis still has an 
important contribution to make. Starting from the intuition that the definition of an expert 
depends upon the epistemic function they fulfil in our communities,2 the paper sheds light 
on two different roles of an expert, i.e., that of improving laypeople’s epistemic 
condition—broadly construed—and that of contributing to the epistemic progress of their 
discipline. The overall aim of this paper is to show that cognitive experts should be 
identified by their ability to perform the latter function, rather than the former.  
To accomplish this goal, in section 2 I introduce the two rival accounts of an expert, 
which I respectively name the novice-oriented account and the research-oriented 
account. Section 3 is devoted to elaborating on their conditions in order to make sure we 
are working with the most convincing version of each account before providing an 
argument against the novice-oriented approach, which will be offered in section 4. In 
section 5, I shall motivate the superiority of the research-oriented account over the rival 
view. Finally, section 6 explores some consequences of the argument for the social 
function of experts. 
 
§2 TWO ACCOUNTS OF EXPERTISE  
 
According to Goldman’s (2018) and Quast’s (2018) recent diagnoses, the epistemological 
debate on the notion of the cognitive expert is based on a fundamental methodological 
                                                        
2 See, e.g., Goldman (2018) and Quast (2018). 
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assumption, according to which a compelling definition of an expert has to reflect their 
function within an epistemic community. More specifically, Goldman contends that such 
definition should highlight “what expertise is by reference to what experts can do for 
laypersons by means of their special knowledge or skill” (2018: 3). For these reasons, a 
functionalist approach to the notion of expertise should provide (i) a functional definition 
of an expert, and (ii) a possession condition that individuates what it takes for an epistemic 
subject to fulfil that function (4).  
As regards (i), Coady (2012) and Goldman (2018) accept what I call a novice-
oriented approach. According to them, “the main function of expertise is sharing some 
knowledge for the benefit of someone else”, where the recipient is often intended as a 
layperson or a novice (Quast 2018: 13). With Coady’s words, experts are supposed to 
fulfil “the practical role of the expert”, that is “being someone laypeople can go to in order 
to receive accurate answers to their questions” (2012: 30). The role of experts suggested 
by Coady is reflected in Goldman’s functional definition, according to which a subject S 
is an expert in domain D if and only if:  
 
[NO-CAP] S has the capacity to help others (especially laypersons) solve a 
variety of problems in D or execute an assortment of tasks in D which the 
latter would not be able to solve or execute on their own. S can provide such 
help by imparting to the layperson (or other client) his/her distinctive 
knowledge or skills. (2018: 4)3 
 
As regards (ii), that is the cognitive states that allow one to fulfil this functional 
definition, Goldman recommends a veritistic or “truth-linked” possession condition, 
                                                        
3 I replace Goldman’s original label “CAP” with “NO-CAP” to stress that on this account experts are 
required to fulfil a novice-oriented function, and make it easy to contrast it with the research-oriented 
function I shall introduce in §5.  
4 
 
according to which an expert is someone who possesses more accurate information than 
most people do in a domain. Specifically, on his view a subject S is an expert in domain 
D if and only if:  
 
[T-LC1] S has more true beliefs and fewer false beliefs in propositions 
pertaining to D than do most people. (4)4 
 
In sum, the novice-oriented account defines expertise as the capacity specified by NO-
CAP and suggests T-LC1 as a necessary and sufficient characterization of what allows 
one to possess that capacity. 
Interestingly enough, some earlier remarks by Goldman allow us to suggest a 
different account of an expert. Even though when he wrote his 2001 paper Goldman did 
not have to face objections to his approach based on conceptual analysis, he already had 
in mind that “expertise features a propensity element as well as an element of actual 
attainment” (92). The propensity element in his less recent view amounts to “an ability to 
generate new knowledge in answer to questions within the domain” (91) while the 
element of actual attainment amounts to an expert’s possession of “more true beliefs 
and/or fewer false beliefs than most people do in D” (91). The distinction between 
propensity and actual attainment can now be adapted to his recent functionalist 
framework and offer grounds for what I call a research-oriented account. Specifically, 
the propensity—that is, disposition-based—element provides us with a research-oriented 
functional definition of expertise, according to which a subject S is an expert in domain 
D if and only if: 
 
                                                        
4 The expression “belief in” is usually understood as involving an element of trust. However, that is not the 
connotation Goldman gives to this condition for expertise. I stick to his own connotation for the sake of 
consistency with his wording. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me. 
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[RO-CAP] S has the capacity to contribute to the epistemic progress of D. S 
can provide such help by offering true answers to the questions under dispute 
in D. 
 
In contrast, the element of actual attainment gives us a slightly different version of 
Goldman’s recent truth-linked possession condition, which I shall call T-LC2, according 
to which a subject S is an expert in domain D if and only if: 
 
[T-LC2] S possesses more true beliefs and/or fewer false beliefs than most 
people do in D. 
 
Thus, the research-oriented account defines expertise as the capacity specified by RO-
CAP and proposes T-LC2 as a necessary and sufficient characterization of what it takes 
for one to possess this capacity. 
A quick comparison of the two accounts suggests a couple of remarks. First, notice 
that T-LC2 not only grants that someone can be an expert by having more true beliefs and 
fewer false beliefs than most people do in D, but also, and more importantly, that one can 
be an expert by having more true beliefs or fewer false beliefs than most people do in D. 
I take T-LC2 to be more problematic than T-LC1, but I shall discuss this in §3.1.  
Second, someone might take the fact that two very similar versions of the truth-linked 
requirement serve as possession conditions on allegedly alternative accounts to be a sign 
that Goldman in fact thinks an expert to be someone who fulfils both a research-oriented 
and a novice-oriented function. Specifically, one might argue that if the propositions 
pertaining to a domain of expertise D include not only propositions at the object level of 
D but also propositions about the processes, methods, and skills the use of which is likely 
to yield true beliefs in D, then satisfying the veritistic condition on the novice-oriented 
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account will typically result in the capacity to generate new knowledge in D (i.e., RO-
CAP), at least in non-empirical domains.5 
I do not buy into this argumentative line, for at least two reasons. First, I think it is 
unsuccessful: as I will show in §5, there are ways in which one can have more true beliefs 
than most people do at all these levels of D and yet lack the capacity to contribute to the 
progress of D. Second, no matter what the most faithful interpretation of Goldman’s 
thought over the years is, we should still keep the two accounts separate for the sake of 
argument. If my arguments hit their target, we can conclude that the research-oriented 
view can account for what it takes to be an expert in Goldman’s recent functionalist 
approach while the novice-oriented view fails to do so. Therefore, let us work on the 
assumption that neither view should be reduced to the other and examine the two accounts 
in detail. 
 
§3 TOWARD A COMPELLING NOVICE-ORIENTED ACCOUNT OF AN EXPERT 
 
The analysis of the novice-oriented account of an expert concerns the plausibility of the 
truth-linked condition and its relationship with the functional definition of expertise 
expressed by NO-CAP. Before starting to discuss the plausibility of the possession 
condition, it would be wise to address a preliminary issue that might affect our 
understanding of the notion of an expert. Some might be inclined to think that the truth-
linked requirement makes Goldman’s account comparative, as the attribution of expertise 
to someone partially depends on the reliability of most members of their epistemic 
community. Goldman does not deny that the notion of an expert has a comparative 
dimension that we refer to when we say that, for example, Anna is more of an expert in 
                                                        
5 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me. 
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contemporary history than Nick, or that Giada is more of an expert in psychology than 
anyone else in the room. However, he adds a non-comparative clause (2001: 91), or 
threshold condition (2018: 5), to this account, according to which “[b]eing an expert is 
not simply a matter of veritistic superiority. Some non-comparative threshold of veritistic 
attainment must be reached” (2001: 91), even though this threshold might be difficult to 
determine.6 Thus, on Goldman’s view the notion of an expert requires a minimum 
threshold of true beliefs in D below which someone should not be considered expert, no 
matter if they are better informed on D than most people in their (or other) communities. 
Coady rejects the threshold condition, considering it unnecessary for a novice-
oriented account. The debate about the necessity of this requirement will be discussed in 
§3.2. Before that, we shall discuss a specific objection against the possession condition, 
according to which T-LC1 is unnecessarily demanding, and offer a refined version of the 
condition that avoids this criticism (§3.1). Finally, we will challenge Goldman’s veritistic 
project by arguing that an understanding-linked requirement better complies with NO-
CAP than a truth-linked condition. A counterexample to standard novice-oriented 
accounts will be offered to support the claim that experts need to possess better 
understanding7 than most people in their domain of expertise (§3.3). 
  
§3.1 The expertise of epistemically negligent subjects 
 
                                                        
6 In recent work (2018), Goldman has developed this thought and maintains that the non-comparative clause 
could be added to the definition of an expert as follows:  
[TL-C*] S is an expert about domain D if and only if: 
(A) S has more true beliefs (or high credences) in propositions concerning D than most people do, 
and fewer false beliefs; and 
(B) The absolute number of true beliefs S has about propositions in D is very substantial. 
He also admits that “the absolute condition stated in (B) is unclear” but contends that “whatever might be 
said to tighten this condition needn’t affect the general type of approach proposed here” (3). Put it simply, 
it should remain a truth-linked, or veritistic, approach. 
7 See §3.3 for a definition of “better understanding”. 
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As I pointed out in §2, the truth-linked requirement introduced in the research-oriented 
account (T-LC2) differs from the one displayed in the novice-oriented account (T-LC1). 
However, given that they share a similar structure and the same components, I will discuss 
both here with the goal of reaching a more robust version of the possession condition that 
can be employed in both accounts. More specifically, I shall argue that T-LC2 is unduly 
weak, whereas T-LC1 is unduly demanding. 
On Goldman’s view, in order for a subject to satisfy T-LC2 it is sufficient that she 
fulfils either of the following requirements: 
 
[T-LCa] S possesses more true beliefs than most people do in D; 
[T-LCb]  S possesses fewer false beliefs than most people do in D. 
 
Scholz (2009) and Coady (2012) argue that Goldman is wrong, because we are not willing 
to consider someone an expert if their superiority to laypeople in terms of reliability 
merely amounts to lacking some of the false beliefs laypeople have in a given domain, as 
required by T-LCb. A quick comparison of experts with epistemically negligent subjects 
should make clear that they are right. 
In general, an expert has a much greater interest in the status and the epistemic 
progress of a given discipline than a layperson does. This interest inevitably comes with 
a greater risk of believing falsehoods in such a domain than laypeople do (see Coady 
2012: 29; Scholz 2009: 193). Indeed, it may be the case that experts have both more true 
beliefs and more false beliefs about their subject matter than laypeople. Thus, experts 
might satisfy T-LCa without being in the position to satisfy T-LCb. In contrast, 
epistemically negligent people lack any interest in the epistemic progress of a domain and 
do not question their beliefs so frequently. Hence, they avoid any risk of acquiring false 
beliefs at the huge cost of not acquiring true beliefs. If we accepted T-LC2 then, 
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epistemically negligent subjects would have a good chance of becoming experts simply 
by fulfilling T-LCb, particularly in those disciplines where there is widespread 
disagreement about the answers to the main questions of each domain.  
This argument not only applies to epistemically negligent subjects, but also to those 
who doubt that we can acquire knowledge in some specific area of inquiry, i.e., local 
skeptics. These subjects can easily satisfy T-LCb: given that they doubt the possibility of 
acquiring knowledge in some domain, they avoid forming beliefs by suspending 
judgment in that domain. Thus, it is likely that they will possess fewer false beliefs than 
any other individual who assumes that knowledge can be obtained in that domain. 
According to Goldman’s loose requirement, local skeptics will then be in the position to 
satisfy the possession condition on a research-oriented account of expertise by fulfilling 
T-LCb, as epistemically negligent people do.  
But again, this result seems counterintuitive. If, for instance, we wanted to know 
more about the potential and the side effects of an experimental cure for cancer, it would 
be very odd to ask a convinced herbalist who treats ill people with herbal extracts and 
suspends judgment on everything related to traditional medical experiments. This subject 
will no doubt have fewer false beliefs on the effects of the experimental treatment than 
the oncologists who are testing the new medicine—in fact, she will have none since she 
withholds judgment. Nevertheless, it seems evident that we would rather consult the 
oncologists than the herbalist, as the former possess more true beliefs about the cure than 
the latter does. 
From these considerations it follows that it should not be the case that T-LCb is a 
sufficient component of the truth-linked condition, in that even epistemically negligent 
lay subjects and local skeptics can satisfy it. Nor should it be the case that T-LCb is a 
necessary component of the truth-linked condition, because an expert who puts forth a 
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new theory in D may entertain more false beliefs than laypeople in D.8 This argument 
allows us to undermine both T-LC2 and T-LC1 at the same time. On the one hand, the 
fact that T-LCb is not a sufficient component of the possession condition proves that T-
LC2 is too weak, because in general we shall not grant expertise to epistemically negligent 
laypeople. On the other hand, the fact that T-LCb is not a necessary component of the 
condition proves that T-LC1 is too demanding. As mentioned in §2, in order for a subject 
to satisfy T-LC1 it is necessary that she fulfil both T-LCa and T-LCb. But, as I have just 
shown, the mere fact that an expert may possess more false beliefs in a domain than 
laypeople do should not undermine her expertise. Thus, there seems to be no reason for 
retaining T-LCb as a component of the truth-linked condition. Goldman (2016) seems to 
acknowledge the effectiveness of this objection in footnote, where he mentions the 
possibility of requiring that experts merely have “a comparatively high ratio of true to 
false beliefs to qualify as experts” (3, fn. 3). For our purposes though, it suffices to follow 
Coady and Scholz and strengthen the possession condition on either account of an expert 
by getting rid of T-LCb. The revised definition of an expert on the novice-oriented 
account then states that S is an expert in D if and only if: 
 
[T-LCa] S possesses more true beliefs than most people do in D. 
 
§3.2 On the necessity of a non-comparative clause 
 
The second criticism of the possession condition on Goldman’s novice-oriented account 
pertains to the non-comparative clause introduced above. Coady contends that there is no 
need to add such a clause to the possession condition, because “if some individuals are 
                                                        
8 Scholz contemplates an even more extreme scenario, in which a layperson might have more true and fewer 
false beliefs about D than an expert (see 2009: 193). 
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significantly better informed than most people about a subject […] in their community, 
then […] they should be considered experts on it, whether or not they are well-informed 
from a God’s-eye point of view” (Coady 2012: 29).  
I agree with Coady that on a novice-oriented account there is no need of a “God’s 
eye” perspective. If the function of expertise merely amounts to helping laypeople acquire 
new knowledge, then a comparative notion of an expert would easily fit the bill. To see 
why this is the case, let us consider a couple of examples featuring Goldman’s idea of 
epistemic communities: that is, groups such as “a doctrinal community whose members 
devoutly and uncritically agree with the opinions of some single leader” (2001: 98), a 
“community of scientists” (103), and professional communities (105).  
First, consider the case of Skyler, an excellent chemistry scholar who is presenting 
the results of her study at an International Chemistry Conference. Both Goldman and 
Coady can grant her the expertise she acquired through years of intense study and 
research. In fact, not only does she have the capacity to help laypeople acquire knowledge 
about chemistry, but she supposedly has more true beliefs than most people do about 
chemistry and she exceeds the threshold condition, wherever we stipulate that it has to be 
set.  
Then, compare Skyler’s case with that of Emma, a young member of a close-minded 
community led by a charismatic faith-healer who pretends to cure ill people with his 
spiritual powers. Suppose also that Emma challenges his opinion based on what she reads 
in an introductory textbook of medicine. In this case, Goldman’s non-comparative clause 
would prevent Emma from being considered an expert in medicine, as she certainly fails 
to fulfil the threshold condition. But that clashes with the methodological assumption of 
his functionalist approach because Emma might well be in the position to help other 
members of her community acquire true beliefs in medicine. Coady’s view avoids this 
problem: on his account, Emma can be an expert in medicine in her community because 
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she is in the position to fulfil NO-CAP. As a matter of fact, Emma has acquired more true 
beliefs than the other members of the community by reading the introductory textbook 
and carefully observing the alleged treatments provided by the faith healer. Were 
someone to notice this fact, they would start to consider her an expert in the field and 
disregard the leader’s advice.  
It should now be evident that, unlike Goldman’s view, Coady’s comparative notion 
of an expert fits the methodological assumption introduced in §1 because it confers 
expertise to epistemic subjects based on the function that they can provide to other 
members of their communities. On the novice-oriented account, both Skyler and Emma 
can be considered experts because they have the ability to provide other members of their 
communities with information they lack, thereby fulfilling NO-CAP. Therefore, pace 
Goldman, there is no reason why we should constrain the novice-oriented account by 
imposing a threshold condition, when a comparative approach—such as Coady’s—
already ensures the accomplishment of the novice-oriented function. 
 
§3.3 Veritism and understanding   
 
Both objections considered so far concerned specific features of Goldman’s truth-linked 
possession condition. However, his veritistic account of an expert incurs at least two 
further problems relative to its broad truth-linked scope. 
The first problem arises from the fact that scientific progress is transitional by 
nature.9 As an example, recall that before the Fifties most scientists believed that 
cigarettes did not contain harmful chemicals; now, we all know that smoking may cause 
cancer and other diseases. This consideration threatens Goldman’s novice-oriented 
                                                        
9 This problem is raised by Watson (2016: 7), who calls it “the shoulders of giants problem”. 
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account because we are obviously unable to put ourselves in the “God’s eye” perspective 
and evaluate who, among thousands of alleged experts, possesses a sufficiently large 
number of true beliefs in some domain. Goldman acknowledges this as “a common 
problem” (2016: 3), yet he holds that this is not enough to undercut the appropriateness 
of the veritistic approach. The mere fact that it’s hard to find out who possesses true 
beliefs in some discipline does not entail that objective expertise cannot be found in that 
domain.10  
Let us assume that Goldman’s defence is successful. A second far more troubling 
issue puts pressure on his approach. Consider the following example: 
 
EXPERT BY HEART. Suppose that Denny, a young ski instructor with a special 
talent for remembering, decides to help his lazy brother Brett pass his 
physiology licensing examination. This difficult exam consists of a random 
selection of 100 multiple choice questions that each candidate receives on 
their laptop at the beginning of the exam session and has to answer in a very 
short amount of time. All candidates know is that the computer selects among 
10000 questions that the examiners gave to each candidate together with the 
reading list. Denny offers to memorize the whole list of 10000 questions, with 
each respective correct answer, and to provide Brett with the list of correct 
replies ten minutes after receiving screenshots of the test. The plan works 
perfectly: following Brett’s instructions, Denny selects the wrong answers to 
five questions on purpose, not to arouse the examiner’s suspicion. With 95% 
of correct answers, Brett is the only candidate who passes the examination 
with distinction this year. 
                                                        
10 Notice that the same problem affects any novice-oriented approach, including Coady’s comparative view. 
For what is problematic in this respect is not the presence of a non-comparative clause, but rather the truth-
linked condition on which novice-oriented accounts are based. 
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If we analyse Denny’s profile under Goldman’s requirements, we notice that Denny 
satisfies T-LCa by hypothesis, as he has acquired more true beliefs about physiology than 
most people do. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suppose that he goes beyond the threshold 
for being an expert in physiology: not only is he significantly better informed than most 
members of his community, but also the overall number of true beliefs in physiology he 
possesses is incredibly high. Finally, Denny fulfils NO-CAP by doing a great service to 
his brother, who did not prepare for the exam. Were other candidates to ask for his help 
in the future, he would be happy to do that, despite any considerations about the morality 
of his actions.  
Nonetheless, it seems intuitively evident that Denny should not be considered an 
expert in physiology. There are at least two ways in which we can try to back this claim 
up. First, one might argue that Denny possesses lots of true, yet unjustified, beliefs: in 
fact, he has no reason to offer in support of these propositions about physiology. However, 
this argumentative line appears to be unpromising on closer inspection. On the one hand, 
it is unclear whether Goldman takes experts to possess not only a substantial number of 
true beliefs in D, but also a substantial number of justified true beliefs in D.11 On the 
other, it can be argued that Denny acquires all this information about physiology from a 
reliable source, such as the list made by the board of examiners, and has no defeaters for 
it. Thus, many epistemologists would agree that Denny has acquired testimonial 
knowledge of these propositions.  
                                                        
11 No mention of justification as a necessary requirement for expertise has been found in Goldman’s 2001 
definition, where he defines an expert as someone who has “extensive knowledge (in the weak sense of 
knowledge, i.e., true belief) of the state of the evidence” (92). In contrast, he explicitly admits the possibility 
of an evidential (or justificational) approach in contrast to, or in support of, a veritistic approach (see 2018: 
6-7), but acknowledges that grounding the definition of an expert on a justification- or evidence-based 
requirement leads to several problems. 
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The second strategy to support the idea that Denny is not an expert appeals to the 
notion of understanding as a fundamental epistemic goal. This notion is open to different 
interpretations. Here I follow a well-established tradition that considers understanding as 
“grasping systematic connections among elements of a complex whole, or gaining insight 
into certain relations between items within a larger body of information” (Jäger 2016: 
180).12 Thus, I focus on the “objectual” dimension of understanding, as related to subject 
matters, theories, and bodies of information requiring explanation, rather than mere 
propositions.13 I appeal to this notion to suggest that what should distinguish experts from 
laypeople is not merely the high number of true beliefs the former—unlike the latter—
possess in some domain D. On the contrary, a more plausible measure of someone’s 
expertise in D is their understanding of the background assumptions of D, the main 
questions arising within the discipline, and the available answers. In sum, experts are 
supposed to understand the relationships between the various components of D. Going 
back to EXPERT BY HEART, it should be evident that Denny lacks expertise in physiology 
because he has no understanding whatsoever of the thousands of true beliefs he learned 
by heart. All he knows is the correct answer associated with each question of the 
examination list.  
Therefore, I suggest that Goldman’s truth-linked condition be replaced with the 
following understanding-linked condition. A subject S is an expert in domain D if and 
only if: 
 
                                                        
12 Further definitions of understanding can be found in Grimm (forthcoming), Kvanvig (2003), and 
Pritchard (2009).  
13 An important difference between objectual understanding and propositional understanding is that 
understanding a proposition p, e.g., understanding that my smartphone is broken, does not seem to 
differentiate much from knowing that p. Rather, understanding a subject matter x, or a domain D, e.g., 
understanding meteorology, cannot be reduced to merely knowing some propositions (see Kvanvig 2009). 
On the propositional model of understanding see also Grimm (2014: 330-ss). For a recent discussion of 
objectual understanding, see Carter and Gordon (2014).  
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[U-LC] S possesses better understanding of D than most people do.  
 
Following Elgin (2007), I take understanding to be matter of degrees. Specifically, I take 
it to include the three following dimensions: breadth—S’s ability to imbed some true 
belief pertaining to a domain into a more comprehensive set of beliefs concerning that 
domain; depth—the number of propositions and/or non-trivial inferential connections 
between propositions within S’s network of beliefs; and significance—S’s ability to 
appreciate the relevance of the beliefs included in D, not merely to recognize that they 
are true (36). I consider the notion of “better understanding” to include all three 
dimensions just introduced, to the extent that if S is an expert in D, S has broader, deeper, 
and more significant grip on the relationship between true bodies of information 
constituting D than most people do.14 Thus, adopting U-LC not only avoids the problem 
generated by EXPERT BY HEART; it also offers a more plausible rendering of the veritistic 
account Goldman aims to provide.  
To briefly summarize, section 3 has been devoted to offering a more plausible version 
of the novice-oriented account of an expert originally proposed by Goldman. First, I 
stressed the advantages of amending Goldman’s truth-linked condition as Coady and 
Scholz suggested, i.e., by getting rid of the false idea that possessing fewer false beliefs 
in a domain than laypeople do is a necessary condition for one to be an expert. Then, I 
argued against Goldman that his threshold condition (or, non-comparative clause) 
unjustifiably constrains the attribution of expertise to a “God’s-eye” perspective. This 
requirement is unnecessary if we simply want experts to exert a novice-oriented function, 
                                                        
14 Scholz (2018) introduces the idea of understanding as a “symptom of expertise” and admits a great variety 
of objects of understanding (34-36). He also concedes that understanding can vary along breadth and depth, 
but makes no reference to the dimension of significance, nor to Elgin’s account. I am not sure what the 
relationship between his Goodmanian idea of “symptoms” and the standard notion of “necessary condition” 
should be. Thus, I limit myself to acknowledging his similar intuitions, and stick to my project of providing 
a compelling account of expertise through conceptual analysis. 
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that is, to provide laypeople with accurate information they lack. Finally, I explained why 
an understanding-linked possession condition fares better than a truth-linked condition 
when it comes to fulfilling NO-CAP.  
As a concluding remark of this section, I shall briefly discuss in which respects the 
novice-oriented account of an expert differs from Jäger’s recent account of a Socratic 
epistemic authority (2016). On Jäger’s view, a Socratic authority is “someone who not 
only succeeds more often in attaining the truth [than the subject does], but who also is 
able to foster the subject’s overall insight into the problem under consideration” (178-79). 
These accounts have two main elements in common: first, they assume that these kinds 
of epistemically superior subjects have a novice-oriented function to fulfil; second, they 
measure the epistemic superiority of both experts and Socratic authorities by the level of 
their respective understanding of a domain.  
However, the accounts also differ in two important respects: First, experts need to be 
epistemically superior to most people in a domain, whereas Socratic authorities merely 
need to be epistemically superior to their interlocutors. Second, the novice-oriented 
account does not restrict the strategies an expert can use to help novices improve their 
epistemic position, while Socratic authorities must perform their function in a very 
peculiar way, namely by using their maieutic ability to ask questions that guide the 
interlocutor to understand things for themselves (see also XXXX: XXXX). I shall return 
to these differences in the next section to discuss important features of the service 
conception of epistemic authority, which Jäger’s account belongs to. For now, it suffices 
to say that despite their commonalities, we have reasons to keep Goldman’s notion of an 
expert and Jäger’s notion of a Socratic authority distinct. 
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§4 AGAINST THE NOVICE-ORIENTED ACCOUNT OF AN EXPERT  
 
Despite the attempt to provide a compelling novice-oriented account of an expert made 
in the previous section, I now want to show that this view is liable to at least two 
objections that make it far less attractive than it might initially seem. Specifically, the 
objections show that the novice-oriented account fails to comply with Goldman’s 
functionalist approach and, in particular, with the methodological assumption introduced 
in §2. First, I shall argue that neither the understanding-linked condition nor Goldman’s 
truth-linked condition suffices to determine what it takes to have the capacity to help 
laypeople solve problems in a given domain, as some further condition is required. 
Second, NO-CAP is too weak as a functional definition of expertise, in that it attributes 
to experts a role that other kinds of epistemic subjects—whom we would not be willing 
to consider experts in general—can easily satisfy.  
Let us consider the first problem affecting the novice-oriented account, namely that 
fulfilling U-LC is not sufficient for one to satisfy NO-CAP. Indeed, there may well be 
subjects who have much better understanding than most people in a domain and 
nonetheless lack the capacity to help others improve their epistemic position in that 
domain. Establishing exactly which dispositions ensure that one has the capacity to help 
novices in some domain appears to be a very difficult task, one that probably involves 
empirical considerations too. For our purposes, it suffices to say that this capacity 
involves at least the following set of intellectual virtues: 
 
Novice-oriented abilities: virtues that allow an epistemic subject to properly 
address a layperson’s epistemic dependency on them (e.g., sensitivity to the 
novice’s needs, intellectual generosity, intellectual empathy, sensitivity to the 
novice’s epistemic resources, and maieutic ability). 
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It should be evident that we do not get these abilities for free simply by having better 
understanding in a domain than most people do. As a matter of fact, there can be several 
ways in which a subject S who fulfils U-LC can fail to display novice-oriented abilities.  
First, S might be unable to figure out what a layperson does not understand about 
their theories, claims, or scientific findings, which S takes to be extremely clear, thereby 
displaying insensitivity to the layperson’s epistemic needs. Second, S might be unable to 
tailor their answer to the novice’s questions: for instance, S might provide overly complex 
information for the novice to understand; alternatively, S might underestimate the 
novice’s epistemic resources and offer overly simplistic information, thereby failing to 
satisfy their epistemic needs. Finally, S might be able to figure out the layperson’s needs 
but lack the ability to ask those questions that guide them to understand things for 
themselves. In this particular situation, S displays a lack of maieutic ability and 
intellectual empathy with the novice’s epistemic situation—i.e., with their level of 
understanding of the domain, with how their understanding could be broadened, 
deepened, or made more significant. 
This list is not supposed to include every possible way in which a subject who has 
better understanding than most people can fail to be a virtuous teacher. It does show 
though that these scenarios are plausible, and therefore puts pressure on those who 
endorse a novice-oriented account of an expert. If we want to find people who can fulfil 
NO-CAP, we cannot simply look for individuals who have great understanding of a 
domain. These subjects need, additionally, to have novice-oriented abilities.  
Before considering the second problem with the novice-oriented account, it is worth 
noticing that the same issue would arise if we stuck to the most plausible version of 
Goldman’s veritistic condition, namely T-LCa. If having better understanding than most 
people do in a domain is not sufficient to identify who can fulfil NO-CAP, a fortiori 
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having more true beliefs than most people do cannot do any better. This is because T-LCa 
can be met by subjects who do not even grasp the relationships between different parts of 
a body of information, which is a fundamental feature that allows one to address others’ 
questions and help them improve their epistemic position in a given field. Thus, we can 
conclude that no matter whether we endorse a truth-linked or an understanding-linked 
possession condition of expertise, further dispositional requirements are needed for one 
to satisfy NO-CAP. 
The second problem with the novice-oriented account is that it offers an overly weak 
functional definition of what it takes for one to be an expert. All that is required for one 
to satisfy NO-CAP is that they are better epistemically positioned than the interlocutor is 
in that domain. A recent debate on the notion of epistemic authority can help us clarify 
this problem. On the service conception of epistemic authority I adopt, following Joseph 
Raz (1986, 2006), Linda Zagzebski (2012), and Christoph Jäger (2016), a subject is an 
epistemic authority for another insofar as they can help their interlocutors achieve some 
epistemic goal in a given domain through their superior knowledge and/or understanding 
to the interlocutors. Thus, the function of epistemic authorities on the service conception 
is just a slightly revised version of Goldman’s NO-CAP.  
However, a relevant difference between the two accounts emerges when we compare 
their respective possession conditions. Elsewhere I argued that a subject S is an epistemic 
authority for a subject S* in domain D insofar as S (i) is more reliable than S* in D and 
(ii) makes use of their novice-oriented abilities to answer S*’s questions in D (see XXXX: 
XXXX).15 As I briefly anticipated in the previous section while discussing Jäger’s view, 
                                                        
15 This definition is meant to refine Zagzebski’s notion of epistemic authority, which is grounded in the 
notion of “epistemic conscientiousness” rather than in “epistemic reliability”. For further discussion on this 
topic, see XXXX (XXXX), Jäger (2016), Keren (2014), and Zagzebski (2012, 2016). Following Zagzebski, 
I work under the assumption that the notion of epistemic authority requires a minimum threshold meant to 
prevent cases in which a reckless person is an authority for an even more reckless interlocutor. Arguably, 
though, the reliability threshold for epistemic authority is lower than the threshold for expertise.  
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the possession condition of epistemic authorities illustrates that the novice-oriented 
function can be fulfilled by subjects who are merely better epistemically positioned than 
their interlocutors but may not be better positioned than most people are in D, as U-LC 
or T-LCa require.  
For example, a grandmother—let’s call her Loren—can help her grandson acquire 
knowledge or understanding of how fish breathe simply by having some vague and basic 
understanding of zoology while he knows nothing about that. Similarly, my friend Yaos 
can teach me what she just learned in an introductory Portuguese course, as I have no 
competence whatsoever in that language. Supposing Loren (or Yaos) also has some 
novice-oriented abilities through which she helps her grandson (me) improve his (my) 
understanding of ichthyology (Portuguese language), she proves to be an epistemic 
authority for the grandson (me) and, at same time, she fulfils NO-CAP.16 But it should be 
evident that neither of them is better epistemically positioned than most people are in the 
respective domains. This is a problem for the novice-oriented account because it shows 
that rather ordinary epistemic subjects, simply by being in an epistemically privileged 
position with respect to their interlocutors, can satisfy its functional definition, which 
should capture a necessary and sufficient capacity for one to be an expert.  
More could be said about the distinction between experts and epistemic authorities, 
but this quick comparison should be enough to show that they are two different kinds of 
epistemically proficient subjects and hence to create trouble for Goldman’s novice-
oriented approach.17 If he wants to hold firm that NO-CAP is a functional definition of 
an expert and to extract possession conditions by reference to it—as his methodological 
assumption requires—he is forced to give up on T-LCa or U-LC and endorse weaker 
                                                        
16 Notice that my account of an epistemic authority is more concessive than Jäger’s in that it contemplates 
the possibility that an authority fulfils the novice-oriented function through their maieutic ability but also 
admits further strategies: for example, an authority can simply teach what they know or present their 
interlocutor with explanatory stories that help them acquire understanding in some domain.  
17 For a more detailed analysis, see XXXX (XXXX). 
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requirements. For NO-CAP merely requires that one be better epistemically positioned 
than the interlocutor is—yet not than most people are in a domain, as U-LC demands. But 
that is no less problematic, because intuitively it seems wrong to contend that epistemic 
authorities such as Yaos and Loren possess what it takes to be an expert simply by being 
better epistemically positioned than their interlocutors in a given domain. These 
considerations allow us to conclude that the novice-oriented account does not comply 
with Goldman’s functionalist approach. But, as I have anticipated, all is not lost: in the 
next section, I shall argue that the research-oriented view is not liable to the same 
objections. 
 
§5 TOWARD A RESEARCH-ORIENTED ACCOUNT OF AN EXPERT  
 
A broader question one might want to ask about the novice-oriented account is what are 
the legitimate and plausible ways an expert can fulfil their novice-oriented function. 
Surely teachers fulfil this role, as I argued in the previous section, but on a more charitable 
reading of NO-CAP it might seem as though also researchers—that is, figures such as 
Marie Curie or Rita Levi Montalcini—should be included. As a matter of fact, 
researchers’ contribution to the progress of a discipline, now or in the future, will allow 
themselves or others to answer the novices’ questions and help an entire community 
improve knowledge and understanding in that field.  
On closer inspection, though, this charitable reading turns into a further problem for 
the novice-oriented approach. Consider the case of a chemistry researcher—let’s call her 
Shyler—who, despite her contribution to the progress of her field through her discoveries 
and publications, is completely deprived of novice-oriented abilities and social skills. 
Shyler’s social interactions are limited to what is necessary for keeping her research 
position at some institution; she conducts her work in isolation as much as possible. I take 
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it that the very fact that she made discoveries in chemistry intuitively suffices to grant 
that Shyler is an expert in that domain, no matter her social limitations. If so, then the 
novice-oriented abilities and the capacity to help laypeople acquire knowledge or 
understanding in a domain become less than necessary features of experts. To 
accommodate a case like this, the novice-oriented account would have to pay a huge cost, 
in that it should water down its novice-oriented spirit to such an extent that it is not 
anymore clear that Shyler and Yaos (or Loren) have a specific capacity in common.  
These considerations allow us to bring the research-oriented account back on stage. 
As I shall argue in the rest of this section, the research-oriented view avoids these 
unwelcome results and complies with Goldman’s methodological assumption better than 
the novice-oriented account does, in that it is not liable to the objections raised in the 
previous section against the novice-oriented account. However, before developing the 
arguments in favor of the research-oriented view, the account has to be refined in light of 
the problems affecting the truth-linked condition discussed in §3. 
In the original version of the research-oriented account, expertise is defined as 
someone’s capacity to give a contribution to the progress of some domain (RO-CAP), 
and the possession of more true beliefs and/or fewer false beliefs (T-LC2) is considered 
as a necessary and sufficient condition for one to fulfil RO-CAP. In §3.1, I offered reasons 
to replace T-LC2 with T-LCa. However, it seems clear that replacing T-LCa with the 
understanding-linked condition (U-LC) has better prospects for success for there are 
many ways in which someone can possess more true beliefs than most people do in a 
domain without having the capacity to contribute to the progress of that domain. To 
consider one of them, let us go back to EXPERT BY HEART (§3.3). The fact that Denny 
fulfils T-LCa does not put him in a position to satisfy RO-CAP—that is, does not ensure 
that he has the capacity to answer new questions arising within a domain. After all, all he 
can do is reply to specific questions about physiology whose answers he learnt by heart, 
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but he has no idea of the current challenges of this field and how to solve them, due at 
least in part to a lack of understanding. 
As I anticipated in §2, someone might want to resist this argument, holding that if 
the propositions pertaining to a domain of expertise D include propositions about the 
processes, methods, and skills the use of which is likely to yield true beliefs in D, then 
satisfying T-LCa will typically result in the capacity to generate new knowledge in D, at 
least in non-empirical domains. I think this move cannot settle the issue. We could think 
of a slightly revised version of EXPERT BY HEART in which Denny helps his brother with 
a difficult algebra exam, and specify that the information Denny learns by heart includes 
propositions about the processes, methods, and necessary skills one needs to deploy in 
the field. But it is hard to see how this could allow him to contribute to the progress of 
the research in algebra. The fact that he has lots of true beliefs about that domain and 
about its research methodologies does not ensure that he understands how these pieces of 
information connect to each other and has the capacity to use them to conduct research in 
algebra. Thus, I think we have good reasons to abandon T-LCa again and endorse U-LC 
as the possession condition on the research-oriented account. 
The rest of the section is devoted to arguing that this view has better prospects to 
succeed as a functionalist account of expertise. The first, general, task is to show that the 
research-oriented account, unlike the novice-oriented one, can accommodate our intuition 
that figures such as Marie Curie but also Shyler are experts while Yaos and Loren are not. 
This view accounts well for such an intuition: specifically, it grants expertise to the former 
as they satisfy the research-oriented function, while the latter do not and therefore lack 
expertise. Indeed, Yaos and Loren have the capacity to address the lay interlocutor’s 
question by virtue of having better understanding than the interlocutor in the respective 
domains, yet both lack the capacity to answer new questions arising within them. As a 
matter of fact, Yaos is just a beginner in Portuguese and Loren only has a rough 
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understanding of some basics of ichthyology. That is good news for the research-oriented 
view because it shows that this account, unlike the novice-oriented one, is not committed 
to grant epistemic authorities the status of experts.  
The second task is to verify whether the research-oriented account complies with 
Goldman’s methodological assumption. To do that, we need to have positive reasons in 
favour of the idea that U-LC is a necessary and sufficient characterization of what it takes 
for one to fulfil RO-CAP. Making a case for the necessity of U-LC is a relatively easy 
task. Surely, one of the reasons why Rita Levi Montalcini managed to contribute to the 
progress of medicine with her work in neurobiology is that she had a much better 
understanding of human physiology, as well as several other branches of medicine, than 
most people have. U-LC is a necessary feature of those who fulfil RO-CAP because this 
capacity involves at least a solid grasp of the relationships that link various elements of a 
domain, previous issues that other people had to solve within the domain, and questions 
that need to be addressed to advance our competence in the domain. But only people who 
have great understanding of a discipline can grasp these elements. 
Yet it is far from clear that U-LC can be a sufficient requirement for individuating 
who satisfies RO-CAP, as there may be subjects who, despite having much better 
understanding than most people do in a domain, still lack the capacity to contribute to its 
progress. Suppose, for instance, that an outstanding scholar who has published dozens of 
important articles in her field is the victim of a terrible car accident, which impairs her 
ability to do research and acquire new information, without compromising her memory 
(see Coady 2012: 30). In such circumstances, the scholar still satisfies U-LC but since she 
is no longer able to keep updated on the progress of her discipline, she loses the capacity 
to contribute to the research in the field, thereby failing to satisfy RO-CAP. 
Besides the case of the impaired researcher, a more general reason why a subject who 
has great understanding in some field might not satisfy RO-CAP is that they may lack 
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important abilities that are necessary for contributing to the research in any field. As in 
the case of the novice-oriented account, we cannot arrive at a conclusive set of necessary 
and sufficient dispositions, but RO-CAP seems to involve at least the following set of 
intellectual virtues:  
 
Research-oriented abilities: virtues that allow an expert or authority to exploit 
their fund of knowledge and understanding to find and face new problems in 
their field of expertise (e.g., thoroughness, intellectual perseverance, 
intellectual courage, self-scrutiny, intellectual creativity, open-mindedness, 
intellectual curiosity, and autonomy). 
 
Coady would disagree with this analysis and argue that having great understanding 
of a domain already shows that one possesses research-oriented abilities and therefore 
conclude that these abilities add no extra requirement to the possession condition (2012: 
29). On closer inspection, this claim seems wrong. As a matter of fact, someone may have 
great understanding of a domain because they are intellectually virtuous and dedicated 
subjects, or because they just have intellectual talent. But a talented subject could lack the 
capacity to address new questions arising in a domain because, for example, they lack the 
curiosity that makes one ask good questions about the problems of the domain, the 
creativity that makes one find possible answers to those problems, the thoroughness that 
is necessary to notice opportunities for progress in small details, the perseverance that is 
necessary to carry on with a project despite objective obstacles, the courage that allows 
one to defend their view in the face of potential harm, or the open-mindedness that allows 
one to consider alternative standpoints.18 Thus, someone might possess great 
                                                        
18 Further considerations on the distinction between intellectual talent and intellectual virtues can be found 
in Baehr (2011: §2). 
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understanding of some field and nonetheless fail to contribute to the progress of that field 
because of a lack of research-oriented abilities, which therefore appear to be necessary 
for a subject who displays great understanding to satisfy the functional definition of 
expertise on the research-oriented account.  
In conclusion, this analysis has shown that the research-oriented account, unlike the 
novice-oriented account, complies with Goldman’s functionalist approach, as it provides 
(i) a functional definition of expertise that other kinds of epistemic subjects—namely, 
epistemic authorities—are unable to fulfil (i.e., RO-CAP), and (ii) a possession condition 
(i.e., U-LC plus research-oriented abilities) that is at least necessary for individuating 
those subjects who can satisfy the functional definition. Furthermore, the research-
oriented account accommodates several intuitive cases that threaten the plausibility of the 
novice-oriented approach. Specifically, it allows us to contend that Shyler is an expert 
because she has the capacity to further the progress of chemistry through her great 
understanding of the domain and the research-oriented abilities she employs to conduct 
research. In contrast, it entails that Yaos and Loren are not experts, because they can 
merely help their respective interlocutor understand something better in a given domain 
but lack both better understanding than most people have in that domain and the abilities 
to contribute to its progress.  
The arguments provided in these sections allow us to conclude that the research-
oriented account better explains what it takes for one to be an expert than the rival, novice-
oriented approach. The fact that the set of research-oriented abilities largely differs from 
that of novice-oriented ones helps us explain why neither functional definition of the two 
competing accounts can be taken to include the other. Just as epistemic authorities have 
the capacity to help others without necessarily possessing the ability to make 
contributions in any domain, so experts can contribute to the progress of their domain 
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without necessarily having the capacity to help their interlocutors acquire knowledge or 
understanding in that domain.  
 
§6 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper surveyed two major approaches to the notion of the cognitive expert, based on 
Goldman’s idea that a compelling definition of an expert needs to reflect the function of 
expertise that these subjects fulfil in the epistemic community. The main goal of this work 
was to show that a research-oriented account complies with Goldman’s functionalist 
approach, while a novice-oriented account fails to do so. To pursue this aim, in section 2 
I introduced the basic features of both views and showed how their functional definitions 
are meant to fall in line with their respective possession condition, as required by 
Goldman’s methodological assumption. In section 3, I refined the possession conditions 
of both accounts to make sure we were working with the best versions of them. In section 
4, I developed an argument against the novice-oriented account by showing that its 
functional definition commits us to grant epistemic authorities the status of experts, 
against our broad intuitions about expertise. Finally, in section 5, I argued that the 
research-oriented account is not liable to the problems affecting the rival approach and 
that it complies with Goldman’s methodological assumption. 
As a final remark, I want to go back to the distinction between experts and epistemic 
authorities introduced in §4. It may have been noticed that in a few passages I 
characterized the difference between epistemic authorities and experts by referring to 
teachers, i.e., those who are trained to help novices acquire knowledge and understanding 
of a given domain, and researchers, i.e., those who are trained to foster the epistemic 
progress of a discipline. In the ideal scenario, we would rather be taught by researchers: 
the more this happens, the better it is for everyone. For, when an expert possesses novice-
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oriented abilities, laypeople can acquire fresh knowledge and understanding from 
someone who works first-hand in the domain. This is beneficial for novices not only 
because it minimizes their risk of getting improper or outdated information, but also 
because an expert can direct them towards the right kind of issues that they need to explore 
if they want to increase their understanding of D.19 
As I tried to argue in sections 4 and 5 though, we cannot take it for granted that 
experts possess novice-oriented abilities. Those who work in education know how 
important it is that teachers be trained to perform their task effectively. It might well be 
the case that great researchers prove to be less effective as teachers than trained teachers 
who lack research-oriented abilities. An important consequence of the argument of this 
paper for real-life scenarios, then, is that we would rather have experts working on 
advances in their fields than spending lots of time teaching novices when they lack the 
capacity to do so. For, if my argument hits the target, it should be clear that experts can 
do a better service to the whole society by fulfilling their research-oriented function than 
by working as—or, trying to become—epistemic authorities. 
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